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Abstract
Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders are
widespread. In this paper, we measure the returns to an occupational license
using novel data on Soviet trained physicians that immigrated to Israel. An
immigrant re-training assignment rule used by the Israel Ministry of Health pro-
vides an exogenous source of variation in re-licensing outcomes. Instrumental
variables and quantile treatment eﬀects estimates of the returns to an occupa-
tional license indicate excess wages due to occupational entry restrictions and
negative selection into licensing status. We develop a model of optimal license
acquisition which suggests that the wages of high-skilled immigrant physicians
in the nonphysician sector outweigh the lower direct costs that these immigrants
face in acquiring a medical license. Licensing thus leads to lower average qual-
ity of service. However, the positive earnings eﬀect of entry restrictions far
outweighs the lower practitioner quality earnings eﬀe c tt h a tl i c e n s i n gi n d u c e s .
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Restricted entry into an occupation through occupational licensing requirements is
a widespread phenomenon. At least 18 percent of the work force in the United
States is aﬀected by occupational licensing, exceeding the impact of the minimum
wage and of unionization (Kleiner (2000)). Occupational licensing is also widespread
in many other countries. In the European Union, for example, occupational entry
restrictions are thought to substantially aﬀect incentives for internal migration (see
Krueger (2000)).
In the traditional theory of economic regulation, occupational licensing is viewed
as a means by which practitioners capture monopoly proﬁts (see Friedman and
Kuznets (1945), Stigler (1971) and Posner (1974)). Licensing might be packaged
as a means to protect the consumer but is more likely a tool used by practitioners to
restrict labor supply and drive up the price of labor. More recent formulations of the
theory tend to emphasize the potential beneﬁts of occupational licensing. Licensing
may improve the average quality of service oﬀered by practitioners by preventing entry
of less-competent practitioners, or by forcing less-competent practitioners to invest in
human capital (Leland (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1981)a n dS h a p i r o( 1986)). The
net social beneﬁts of licensing are thus ambiguous, but occupational licensing still
leads to excess wages for practitioners.
The existing empirical evidence on the earnings eﬀects of occupational entry re-
strictions, however, is inconclusive. Previous empirical studies, which mostly use
data from the US and Canada, usually ﬁnd higher mean earnings for individuals in
regulated occupations, holding observed human capital levels constant (see, e.g., Ben-
ham, Maurizi, and Reder (1968), Muzondo and Pazderka (1980), Pashigian (1980),
Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) and Kleiner (2000)). But the data used in these studies
generally do not permit identiﬁcation of the causal eﬀects of entry restrictions on
earnings. Entry restrictions and self-selection into the regulated occupation are often
confounded.
2In this paper, the returns to an occupational license are measured using novel
data on the early labor market outcomes of Soviet immigrant physicians in Israel.
The data provide a unique opportunity to identify the causal eﬀects of occupational
licensing on earnings and empirically assess the hypothesis of excess wages. The
opportunity is unique for several reasons. First, Soviet immigrant physicians are a
relatively homogeneous group of individuals in terms of previous education and type
of work experience. Second, many Soviet immigrant physicians did not get re-licensed
and/or obtain employment in their original profession. Third, and most important,
the Israel Ministry of Health exogenously placed Soviet immigrant physicians on one
of two diﬀerent re-training tracks with inherently diﬀerent probabilities of acquiring
a license.
The exogenous assignment rule utilized by the Israel Ministry of Health places
Soviet immigrant physicians either on a re-training track that requires the passing
of a licensing exam (the exam track), or on a re-training track that grants a tempo-
rary medical license for six months and allows immigrant physicians to immediately
practice medicine under observation (the observation track). At the end of the six
month period under observation, immigrant physicians receive a permanent medical
license with near certainty. Immigrant physicians with more than a cutoﬀ number of
years of previous physician experience are assigned to the observation track. Assigned
re-training track is not a function of immigrant unobservables.
Although the Ministry of Health’s assignment rule is a near deterministic func-
tion of years of previous physician experience and previous physician experience di-
rectly aﬀects earnings in the host country, assigned re-training track can be used to
construct instrumental variable estimates of the returns to an occupational license,
thus correcting for nonrandom selection into licensing status. The discontinuities in
the relationship between previous physician experience and licensing status can be
matched to the discontinuities in the relationship between previous physician experi-
ence and immigrant earnings. The correlation between these discontinuities identiﬁes
3the causal eﬀects of being licensed as long as it is the assignment rule and not some
other mechanism that is generating the discontinuities in licensing outcomes.1
According to OLS estimates, Soviet immigrant physicians that acquire a medical
license in Israel have substantially higher mean monthly earnings than their unlicensed
counterparts. However, OLS estimates are biased to the extent that licensing status
is related to potential outcomes without a license. Instrumental variables estimates
that isolate the returns to a license among compliers, i.e., individuals that would not
have obtained a license had they not been assigned to the observation track, yield an
increase in mean monthly earnings that is considerably higher than that estimated
by OLS.2 The extremely large and signiﬁcant instrumental variables estimates of the
returns to a license, compared to OLS estimates, suggest negative selection and excess
wages due to occupational entry restrictions.
The causal eﬀect of an occupational license on the earnings of compliers is also
estimated using a quantile treatment eﬀects model. Quantile treatment eﬀects esti-
mates are less sensitive to the inclusion of zero earnings for the unemployed as well as
high earnings outliers. Quantile treatment eﬀects estimates indicate that the returns
to an occupational license are large at all examined quantiles, but acquisition of a
license more substantially increases the upper quantiles of the earnings distribution
than the lower quantiles. More highly skilled practitioners thus beneﬁtm o r ef r o m
entry restrictions than do less-skilled practitioners.
The quantile treatment eﬀects model is also used to estimate the distribution of
earnings without a license among those immigrants that obtained a license. The
1The regression discontinuity identiﬁcation strategy originated with Campbell (1969). More
recent applications include van der Klauuw (1996), Angrist and Lavy (1998) and Hahn, Todd and
van der Klauuw (1998). See also Angrist and Krueger (2001).
2Compliers are individuals whose treatment status is aﬀected by the instrument. The eﬀect
among compliers in this case is also the local average treatment eﬀect (see Imbens and Angrist
(1994) and Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996)).
4counterfactual earnings distribution indicates negative selection into licensing status,
contrary to the usual hypothesis of positive selection. In order to illustrate how oc-
cupational licensing can lead to both excess wages and negative selection, a model of
the decision to acquire a license is developed. The model, together with the empiri-
cal ﬁndings, suggests that the wages that high-skilled immigrant physicians earn as
nonphysicians outweigh the lower direct costs that these immigrants face in acquiring
a license. Licensing thus leads to lower average quality of service. However, the pos-
itive earnings eﬀect of entry restrictions far outweighs the lower practitioner quality
earnings eﬀect that licensing induces.
Finally, the rate of median earnings convergence between immigrants and compa-
rable natives is examined using the quantile treatment eﬀects estimates. The large
and persistent median earnings gap between licensed immigrants and comparable na-
tives suggests that the excess wages immigrants capture in the regulated occupation
may be tempered by consumer and/or employer preferences for native services.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy describes
the recent Soviet immigration wave to Israel and the institutional background of im-
migration physician re-licensing. Section 3 discusses the data source and descriptive
statistics, reports OLS estimates of the returns to a license and presents a graphical
analysis of the correlation between discontinuities. Section 4 describes the formal
measurement framework. Section 5 reports reduced form, constant-eﬀects instrumen-
tal variables estimates and quantile treatment eﬀects estimates of the returns to a
license. Section 6 presents the model of optimal license acquisition and interprets
the empirical ﬁndings. Section 7 examines median earnings convergence between
immigrants and comparable natives. Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
52B a c k g r o u n d
Between October 1989 and December 1995,a p p r o x i m a t e l y600,000 Jews from the
former Soviet Union immigrated to Israel. By the end of 1995,t h e s ei m m i g r a n t s
accounted for 11% of the Israeli population. The large inﬂux of Soviet immigrants
to Israel was a direct result of the fall of the Soviet Union and the ensuing political
uncertainty.
Despite the unprecedented magnitude of the immigration wave, a large proportion
of Soviet immigrants entered the Israeli labor market quickly, accepting jobs for which
they were clearly over-qualiﬁed (see Weiss, Sauer and Gotlibovski (2003)). With time
in Israel, the wages of immigrants grew sharply and the variability in wages across
schooling groups and occupations increased (Eckstein and Weiss (1998) and Friedberg
(2000)). During the same period, the employment and wages of Israeli natives were
not observed to be adversely aﬀected due to increased capital inﬂows and increased
exports (see Friedberg (2001) a n dE c k s t e i na n dW e i s s( 2002)).
The mass immigration wave contained an unusually large number of physicians.
Before the arrival of Soviet immigrant physicians, Israel already had one of the highest
physician to population ratios in the world. The population of Israel, at the end of
1989, was 4.56 million and there were 13,000 native physicians between the ages of
25 and 64.3 Between October 1989 and August 1993,a p p r o x i m a t e l y12,500 Soviet
immigrant physicians arrived, nearly doubling the potential supply of physicians. The
demand for medical services also increased as the population grew by a substantial
10% during the period.
According to Israeli immigration law, physicians that were licensed to practice
medicine in a foreign country, and that have their foreign medical credentials rec-
ognized by the Israel Ministry of Health, must pass a re-licensing exam in order to
3The number of doctors per 100,000 Israelis in 1989 was 285. In the same year in the US, there
were 216 doctors per 100,000 Americans.
6practice medicine. However, immigrant physicians that practiced clinical medicine
and that have substantial previous physician experience are exempt from the exam.
Until November 1992,t h ec u t o ﬀ number of years required for exemption from the li-
censing exam was 20.T h ec u t o ﬀ was subsequently lowered to 14 in order to increase
the proportion of immigrant physicians with a license. The lowering of the cutoﬀ was
not publicized beforehand.
Immigrant physicians that are granted an exemption from the licensing exam must
work under observation for six months in designated public hospitals or community
clinics. During the six month work under observation period, immigrants receive a
salary and minimal income support from the Ministry of Absorption. At the end of
the six month period these immigrants receive a permanent license in general medicine
with near certainty.
Immigrant physicians that are required to pass the licensing exam are eligible,
but not required, to participate in a government sponsored examination preparation
course. Over 90% of immigrants that are referred to the licensing exam choose to
participate in a preparation course. Preparation courses last six months, are oﬀered
twice a year and are held in public hospitals throughout the country. Immigrant
physicians registered for a preparation course also receive minimal income support
from the Ministry of Absorption. A permanent license in general medicine is acquired
after passing the exam.4
After successful completion of the re-licensing requirements, immigrant physicians
must request to be recognized as specialists in order to practice medicine in their
former specialty. The Ministry of Health denies an overwhelming majority of these
requests. Immigrant physicians whose requests are denied must fulﬁll a post-licensing
residency requirement that includes successful completion of two specialty exams. The
4Approximately 14% of the immigrant physicians chose to re-train in alternative professions.
Many of these immigrant physicians re-trained in paramedical professions such as gerontology, emer-
gency medicine and alternative medicine.
7residency requirement can last a number of years depending upon medical specialty.5
The status of specialist is not required for performing rounds in hospitals or treating
patients in residential communities.
3D a t a
The relevant population of immigrant physicians for this study is the subset of immi-
grants that arrived in Israel from the former USSR between October 1989 and June
1992, that submitted a request to the Israel Ministry of Health to start the process
towards re-licensing, that had their medical credentials in the former USSR recog-
nized, and that were referred to either the exam track or the observation track for
re-training. Of the immigrants that declared at the airport, on the day of arrival,
that they were physicians in the former USSR, 27% did not submit their credentials
to the Ministry of Health.6 Of the immigrants that submitted their credentials, 3%
did not have their credentials recognized.7 Of the immigrants that had their medi-
cal credentials recognized, 3% were not referred to one of the two re-training tracks.
These latter immigrants were either required to do a one year internship before being
eligible for the exam track or were immediately granted recognition as specialists.
The total number of immigrant physicians in this restricted population is 6,754.
Between the months of May and November of 1994, 731 of these 6,754 immigrant
physicians were surveyed, in face-to-face interviews, by Russian-speaking enumerators
using a questionnaire written in Russian. The survey was conducted under the aus-
5Only a small percentage of immigrant physicians were in specialist residency at the time of the
survey.
6The nonsubmitters are more likely than submitters to be women and over 55 years of age on
arrival.
7Immigrants that did not have their credentials recognized are younger than those that had their
credentials recognized.
8pices of the JDC-Brookdale Institute of Jerusalem, The Israel Ministry of Health and
the Israel Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. The random sample of 731 immigrant
physicians was stratiﬁed by assigned re-training track and geographical region. The
goal was to interview 10% of the restricted population. A reserve list of immigrants
was prepared, according to the same stratiﬁcation rules, to substitute for those on the
original list that could not be interviewed. In total, 1,002 immigrant physicians were
approached for interviewing. In descending order of importance, those on the origi-
nal list that were not interviewed were either not located, refused to be interviewed,
return migrated, or had passed away.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays selected descriptive statistics for the sample by assigned re-training
track. Of the 731 immigrant physicians in the sample, only 2 immigrants did not
have a re-training track coded. Of the 414 immigrant physicians assigned to the
exam track, 73% passed the re-licensing exam. Immigrants that were assigned to the
exam track and that did not acquire a license either never took the exam or took the
exam and failed. Of the 315 immigrant physicians assigned to the observation track,
89% worked under observation and acquired a permanent license. The 11% among
this latter group that are coded as not having acquired a permanent license reported
that they never looked for a place to begin work under observation.
The ﬁgures in Table 1 show that mean monthly earnings (including zeros for the
unemployed), the employment rate and the rate of employment as a physician, at
the time of the survey, are higher among immigrants assigned to the exam track.
Individuals assigned to the exam track are, on average, 18 years younger and have
18 years less physician experience in the former USSR. These immigrants also have
more children under the age of 18 living at home at the time of arrival. Note that
a considerable proportion of immigrant physicians on the observation track are not
employed as physicians. Immigrants that are employed but not working as physicians
9are mostly working as post-secondary education teachers, social workers, qualiﬁed
nurses, optometrists, medical technicians and paramedics. There are also immigrant
physicians working in less skilled occupations as unqualiﬁed nursemaids, cleaners in
institutions, security guards, and skilled and unskilled workers in industry.8
In terms of gender composition, size of last city of residence in the former USSR
(more than 1,000,000 inhabitants), continuation of studies in the former USSR to-
wards an advanced medical degree and the number of months since arrival, the im-
migrants are quite similar by re-training track. There are only slight diﬀerences in
marital status upon arrival, republic of origin and type of medical practice in the
former USSR. There is a large diﬀerence in former specialist status. Note that over
95% of the immigrants in the sample arrived during the years 1990 and 1991.9
3.2 OLS Estimates
OLS estimates of the increase in monthly earnings (including zeros for the unem-
ployed) due to acquisition of a license are reported in Table 2.C o l u m n(1) does not
include any other covariates and yields a precisely estimated coeﬃcient on licensed of
1279 New Israeli Shekel (NIS).10 In 1994, the year in which earnings are reported, 1
NIS is approximately equal to .33 US dollars. The estimated increase in earnings of
1279 NIS corresponds to a percentage impact of 109%.11
8Among immigrant physicians employed as physicians, 41% work for the government (local and
national). The remainder work for HMO’s and other private employers. Only 6% found work as a
direct continuation of re-training.
9The percentage of immigrant physicians among all immigrants from the former USSR that
arrived after 1991 is signiﬁcantly smaller.
10All standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.
11The percentage impact is calculated as the ratio of the coeﬃcient on licensed to the ﬁtted value
from the regression with the licensed dummy set to zero and other covariates set to the means among
individuals with a license, when other covariates are included.
10Column (2) adds covariates to the regression, but excludes previous physician
experience. The other regressors include a dummy for age on arrival (older than 50),
dummies for year of arrival, months in Israel, gender, marital status, profession of
spouse, number of children living at home under 18, size of last city of residence,
Republic of origin, pursuit of an advanced medical degree, previous specialist status,
previous type of medical practice and type of reported earnings (after-tax and/or after
other deductions.) The coeﬃcient on licensed in this latter regression is a precisely
estimated 1211, which corresponds to a percentage impact of 98%.C o l u m n(3) adds
years of physician experience in the USSR and its square. The coeﬃcient on licensed
further decreases in strength to 1162 but is still precisely estimated. The percentage
impact is 90%.
Column (4) reports the results of adding an indicator for being employed as a
physician in the full sample. The coeﬃcient on licensed turns negative, is quite small
in magnitude and is not precisely estimated. The coeﬃcient on physician, however,
is a substantial 2324 and is precisely estimated. The OLS results do not indicate
as i g n i ﬁcant return to a license when not employed as a practicing physician. A
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on licensed in this latter speciﬁcation would have been suggestive
of a signalling value to a medical license.
Columns (5) and (6) repeat the speciﬁcations in Columns (3) and (4) for the
subsample of immigrants that have previous physician experience between 14 and
26 years. This subsample of immigrants is referred to as the “discontinuity” sam-
ple. Restricting the analysis to the discontinuity sample helps control for diﬀerences
in unobservables between immigrants that are aﬀected by the assignment rule and
t h o s et h a ta r en o t . T h ee x p e r i e n c el e v e l s14 and 26 are, respectively, the 45th and
75th percentiles in the previous physician experience distribution.12 The estimated
coeﬃcient on licensed in the discontinuity sample is considerably stronger than in
12The experience distribution is skewed to the right with a mean of 16, a standard deviation of
11 and a median of 18.
11the corresponding speciﬁcation in the full sample. The estimated coeﬃcient without
adding a physician employment indicator is 1254 with a standard deviation of 373.
The percentage impact is 114%.C o l u m n(6) reports the results for the speciﬁcation
which adds the physician employment indicator in the discontinuity sample only. The
estimated coeﬃcient on licensed is now positive but is still negligible in magnitude
and imprecisely estimated.13
3.3 Graphical Discontinuity Analysis
The discontinuities in the data that arise as a result of the re-training assignment
rule are illustrated in Figures 1 through 5.I n F i g u r e 1, the strong relationship
between assigned re-training track and license acquisition can be clearly seen. Figure
1 plots the proportion of immigrant physicians assigned to the observation track, the
proportion acquiring a medical license and the proportion employed as physicians at
the time of the survey, against years of physician experience in the former USSR.
The proportion assigned to the observation track is zero until 14 years of experience.
Between 14 and 19 years of experience the proportion ﬂuctuates between 12 and 33
percent. At 20 years of experience the proportion sharply jumps up and ﬂuctuates
between 92 percent and 100 percent. After 26 years of experience, the proportion
remains at 100 percent.14
Note that the proportion of immigrant physicians acquiring a license starts out
quite high but then declines and stabilizes until 14 years of experience. Starting at 14
years of experience, the proportion acquiring a license jumps up together with jumps
in the proportion assigned to the observation track. The proportion of immigrant
physicians employed as physicians in Israel also starts out quite high and subsequently
13The eﬀect of license acquisition on employment probabilities is similar to the eﬀect on physician
employment probabilities. The eﬀect on physician employment probabilities will be discussed below.
14Only 32 out of the 729 immigrants in the sample were assigned to the observation track according
to the 14 year cutoﬀ.
12declines and stabilizes. However, the proportion employed as physicians does not
appear to consistently jump together with the proportion assigned to the observation
track.
Figure 2 plots mean monthly earnings at the time of the survey and the propor-
tion acquiring a license against years of physician experience in the former USSR.15
Note that mean monthly earnings decline sharply with years of previous physician
experience. This downward trend in earnings is consistent with a higher rate of depre-
ciation of source country human capital with pre-migration tenure. Notice, however,
that mean monthly earnings tend to increase, breaking the downward trend, with
sharp increases in the proportion acquiring a license.
The conclusions drawn from Figures 1 and 2 are tentative because they do not
take into account the eﬀect of other covariates on licensing and monthly earnings
outcomes. It is possible that stronger correlations in discontinuities are being hidden
by eﬀects of other covariates. For example, immigrant physicians that pursued an
advanced medical degree in the USSR have less imported physician experience and
higher monthly earnings in Israel causing the trend in mean monthly earnings as
depicted in Figure 2 to be biased downward. Biases due to omitted variables may
aﬀect licensing and monthly earnings outcomes diﬀerently in magnitude and direction.
Figure 3 plots the residuals from separate linear regressions, that have acquisi-
tion of a license and employment as a physician as dependent variables. The linear
regressions include the same covariates as in the OLS regressions in the previous
section, but exclude previous physician experience. The ﬁgures now display sharper
discontinuities in the licensing and employment as a physician outcomes. However,
the discontinuities in licensing outcomes are sharper within the relevant experience
15Four year experience intervals are used to construct Figures 2 through 5 i n s t e a do ft h es i n g l e -
value intervals in Figure 1. The four year experience intervals help reduce the greater idiosyncratic
variation in the monthly earnings data. The experience axis records the integer value of the interval
midpoint.
13range in which there is variation in assignment to the observation track. In contrast,
the discontinuities in employment as a physician are somewhat sharper outside of the
relevant experience range.
Figure 4 plots license residuals and monthly earnings residuals against previous
physician experience. The ﬁgures now display a stronger correlation, both in trend
and discontinuities, between monthly earnings and licensing outcomes than in Figure
2. Both monthly earnings and the proportion acquiring a license fall sharply with
experience and then either fall less sharply or jump up with changes in the proportion
acquiring a license.
Figure 5 re-examines the relationship between monthly earnings, employment as a
physician and previous physician experience. The employment as physician residuals
decline sharply with imported physician experience at low levels of experience and
increase with the monthly earnings residuals at both the 13 and 21 years of previous
experience interval midpoints. However, the correlation in discontinuities between
employment as a physician and monthly earnings appears weaker than between license
acquisition and monthly earnings.
4M e a s u r e m e n t F r a m e w o r k
4.1 Constant-Eﬀects Model
The discontinuities in the data, described graphically in the previous section, can be
exploited within a formal model of statistical inference to identify the causal eﬀect
of an occupational license on earnings. Consider the following linear, constant-eﬀects
causal model that connects the earnings of immigrant i at time t, Yit, with the occu-
pational licensing status of individual i at time t, Lit, plus a vector Xi of immigrant
characteristics at the time of arrival and a random error component speciﬁc to indi-
viduals at time t, ²it:
Yit = X
0
iβ + tδ + Litα + ²it. (1)
14Immigrant characteristics at the time of arrival, included in the vector Xi,a r et h e
same as those included in the previous OLS regressions. Importantly, the vector Xi
contains polynomials in previous physician experience in order to control for smooth
eﬀects of experience on earnings. Note that time in Israel, t, is included as a control
variable in (1) and is, like the other elements of Xi, widely believed to be exogenous
to potential labor market outcomes among those immigrants that arrived in the ﬁrst
three years of the immigration wave. All of the physicians in the sample arrived
in Israel within this time frame.16 The time in Israel variable generically captures
changes in language ability, social networks and knowledge of local institutions.17
The interpretation of equation (1) is that it describes the earnings of immigrants
under alternative assignments of licensing status, controlling for any eﬀects of Xi
and t. However, since Lit is not randomly assigned and is likely to be correlated
with potential earnings, in this case ²it, OLS estimates of (1) do not have a causal
interpretation. Instrumental variables estimates of (1) do have a causal interpretation
as long as it is reasonable to assume that, after controlling for Xi and t,t h ea s s o c i a t i o n
between assignment to the observation track and monthly earnings is solely due to
the association between observation track assignment and licensing status.
Expressed more formally, the “ﬁrst stage” relationship, or the association between
licensing status, assignment to the observation track and Xi and t is:
Lit = X
0
iπ0 + tπ1 + TR iπ2 + ξit, (2)
where TR i =1indicates assignment to the observation track and TR i =0indicates
assignment to the exam track. The error term ξit is deﬁned as the residual from
16Variation in the number of months in Israel is strongly correlated with the size of the last city
of residence in the former USSR. Immigrants that arrived earlier came from big cities in which there
was greater access to information, government oﬃces and consulates.
17The data include measures of English and Hebrew ability at the time of the survey. However,
these variables are strongly endogenous and strongly correlated with time in Israel. They are,
therefore, not used in the analysis.
15the population regression of Lit on Xi and t and the instrument, TR i. This residual
captures other factors that are correlated with licensing status. These other factors
are also probably correlated with potential earnings. For example, immigrants that
have higher unobserved general skill levels, may be more likely to pass the exam and
may also be more likely to have higher earnings without a license. The OLS estimate
of α would thus be biased upward. It is also possible that immigrants that acquire
a license have diﬀerentially lower earnings potential without a license and a lower
opportunity cost of re-training. In this latter case, the OLS estimate of α would
likely be biased downward. In either case, the non-zero correlation between ²it and
ξit leaves OLS estimates of (1) without a causal interpretation.
The key identifying assumption that underlies estimation using TR i as an instru-
ment is that any eﬀects of previous physician experience on monthly earnings in Israel
are adequately controlled by the smooth functions of previous physician experience
included in X0
iβ a n d“ p a r t i a l l e do u t ”o fTRi by the inclusion of smooth functions
of previous physician experience in X0
iπ0. If this assumption is reasonable, then the
discontinuities in earnings with imported physician experience, as depicted in the
graphical analysis, is likely due to the acquisition of an occupational license.18
The same discussion above carries through for measuring the eﬀect of working as
a physician in place of the eﬀect of acquiring a license. However, identiﬁcation of the
eﬀect of working as a physician is doubtful considering the weaker partial correlation
between assigned re-training track and employment as a physician displayed in the
graphical analysis.
4.2 Quantile Treatment Eﬀects Model
The constant-eﬀects model, as speciﬁed in (1), does not allow for diﬀerential eﬀects
of acquiring a license at diﬀerent points in the monthly earnings distribution. This
18Card (1999) surveys evidence supporting the smoothness assumption in the relationship between
experience and earnings.
16is especially problematic since the monthly earnings distribution has a mass point at
zero. The eﬀect of acquiring a license on participation may be substantially diﬀerent
from the eﬀect of acquiring a license on conditional-on-positive mean earnings. An
alternative estimation strategy that is less sensitive to the inclusion of zero earnings,
that is less demanding than formal sample-selection models, and that is less sensi-
tive to earnings outliers, is the quantile treatment eﬀects model (Angrist (2001) and
Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002)). The quantile treatment eﬀects model modiﬁes
traditional quantile regression for inclusion of an endogenous binary regressor.19
The quantile treatment eﬀects model speciﬁes a linear relationship between earn-
ings and licensing status at each quantile. That is,
Qθ [Yi|Xi,L i,L 1i >L 0i]=X
0
iβθ + Liαθ (3)
where L1i denotes licensing status when assigned to the observation track (TR i =1 )
and L0i denotes licensing status when assigned to the exam track (TR i =0 ) .20 The
coeﬃcient αθ has a causal interpretation because Li is independent of potential earn-
ings outcomes conditional on Xi and being a complier (L1i >L 0i).21
The parameters of the quantile treatment eﬀects model are estimated by minimiz-
ing the sample analog of
E [κiρθ (Yi − X
0
ibθ − Liaθ)] (4)
where ρθ is the “check function” (Koenker and Basset (1978))a n dt h eκi are weights
that transform the conventional quantile regression minimand into a problem for com-
pliers only. For computational reasons κi is replaced by an estimate of E [κi|Xi,L i,Y i]
where
E [κi|Xi,L i,Y i]=1−
Li (1 − E [TR i|Yi,L i,X i])
(1 − E [TR i|Xi])
−
(1 − Li)E [TR i|Yi,L i,X i]
E [TR i|Xi]
. (5)
19See Chamberlain (1991) and Buchinsky (1991,1994) for discussion and applications of traditional
quantile regression.
20Time in Israel is suppressed for convenience.
21See Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) for the proof of this statement.
17The ﬁrst step estimate of E [κi|Xi,L i,Y i] is obtained by separately estimating E [TR i|Yi,L i,X i]
and E [TR i|Xi].
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Reduced Form Estimates
Reduced form estimates of the eﬀect of being assigned to the observation track are
reported in Table 3.C o l u m n s (1), (2) and (3) of Table 3 report the eﬀect of being
assigned to the observation track on monthly earnings in the full sample. Without
controls for other regressors and previous physician experience, there is a negative
association between assignment to the observation track and monthly earnings. The
track variable is picking up the downward trend in earnings with greater pre-migration
experience. The association between being assigned to the observation track and
monthly earnings becomes signiﬁcantly positive with the addition of other regressors
and previous physician experience and its square. The coeﬃcient on track in this
latter speciﬁcation is 571 with a standard error of 255. The percentage impact is
14%.C o l u m n(4) reports the same speciﬁcation as in Column (3) in the discontinuity
sample only. The coeﬃcient on track is stronger, 628, but somewhat less precisely
estimated. The percentage impact increases to 23%.
Columns (5), (6) and (7) of Table 3 report the eﬀect of being assigned to the
observation track on licensing status in the full sample. In all three linear probability
models, assignment to the observation track increases the probability of acquiring a
license. The estimated coeﬃcient on track, without any other regressors, is 0.159.
Including other regressors increases the estimated coeﬃcient to 0.231.A d d i n g p r e -
vious physician experience and its square further increases the estimated coeﬃcient
on track to 0.338.C o l u m n(8) reports the same speciﬁcation as in Column (7) in the
discontinuity sample only. The coeﬃcient on track in this latter speciﬁcation is 0.258.
In all four speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient on track is precisely estimated.
18Columns (9), (10) and (11) of Table 3 report the eﬀect of being assigned to the
observation track on employment status as a licensed physician in linear probability
models in the full sample. Without controls for previous physician experience, there is
a negative association between track and employment status as a physician. Adding
previous physician experience yields a positive coeﬃcient on track, but the association
is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. The speciﬁcation with previous physician
experience in the discontinuity sample only, reported in Column (12), produces an
imprecise negative association.
Since there is a weak ﬁrst stage relationship between employment status as a
physician and assigned re-training track, in the linear probability models, it is not
possible to consistently estimate the eﬀect of being employed as a physician on earn-
ings. The strong ﬁrst stage linear relationship between acquisition of a license and
assigned re-training track does allow consistent estimation of the eﬀect of obtaining
a license on earnings and thus inference on the existence of excess wages. The only
drawback is that the eﬀect of obtaining a license on earnings will include the returns
to a medical license in nonphysician jobs. However, the OLS results in Table 2 suggest
that the returns to a license outside of the medical profession are negligible.
5.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates
Instrumental variables estimates of the eﬀect of acquiring a license in a constant-
eﬀects model are reported in Table 4. Acquisition of a license is instrumented by
assigned re-training track.22 Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 4 report the esti-
mated coeﬃcients on licensed without any other regressors, with other regressors but
excluding previous physician experience, and with other regressors and a quadratic
in previous physician experience, respectively. The estimated coeﬃcient on licensed
with other regressors and a quadratic in previous physician experience is 1638 with a
22The instrumental variables estimates deviate somewhat from the ratio of the relevant reduced-
form estimates in Table 3 due to diﬀerent sample sizes.
19standard error of 706. The percentage impact is 182%. Correcting for nonrandom se-
lection in licensing status in a constant-eﬀects framework yields a percentage impact
that is approximately double the corresponding percentage impact produced by OLS
(90%).
Considering that instrumental variables estimates in a regression discontinuity
design may be quite sensitive to the way in which the variable generating the discon-
tinuity is controlled, Column (4) of Table 4 reports the results of including a third
order polynomial in previous physician experience. The estimated eﬀect of a license in
this latter speciﬁcation is 1865 with a standard error of 864. The percentage impact
grows to 262%.
Column (5) of Table 4 reports the results of including a quadratic in previous
physician experience in the discontinuity sample only. The estimated coeﬃcient on
licensed further grows to 1886, but is somewhat less precisely estimated The per-
centage impact is 342%. The corresponding percentage impact according to OLS in
Table 2 is 114%.
There are several additional results to note that are not shown in Table 4 for
the sake of brevity.23 First, there are no signiﬁcant interactions between licensing
status and the other covariates, where licensing status is instrumented by assigned re-
training track in the interaction terms as well. Second, diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences type
speciﬁcations that control for cohort (subject to 14 year assignment cutoﬀ), having
more than 14 years of previous physician experience and an interaction between these
latter two dummies do not yield signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the interaction terms. The
implication is that the small subset of individuals that have between 14 and 19 years
of experience and that are assigned to diﬀerent re-training tracks do not diﬀerentially
contribute to the identiﬁcation of the returns to a license.
23The additional results are available from the authors upon request.
205.3 Quantile Regression and Treatment Eﬀect Estimates
The top panel of Table 5 reports quantile regression and quantile treatment eﬀect
estimates of the eﬀect of licensing status on monthly earnings in the full sample.
Licensing eﬀects are measured at the 0.15, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75 and 0.85 quantiles of the
monthly earnings distribution. Quantile regression estimates treat licensing status as
exogenous and produce the largest percentage impacts of acquiring a license, 93% and
117%,a tt h e0.15 and 0.25 quantiles, respectively. The percentage impact steadily
declines at higher quantiles, falling to 59% p e r c e n ta tt h e0.85 quantile. At each
quantile the coeﬃcient on licensed is precisely estimated.
Quantile treatment eﬀects estimates that correct for the endogeneity of licensing
status yield substantially diﬀerent results. The percentage impact of acquiring a
license at the 0.15 and 0.25 quantiles are both 50%, considerably lower than the
quantile regression estimates. The percentage impact at the 0.50, 0.75 and 0.85
quantiles are, on the other hand, considerably higher than the quantile regression
estimates. The quantile treatment eﬀects model produces the largest percentage
impact, 169%,a tt h e0.85 quantile. At each quantile the coeﬃcient on licensed is
precisely estimated.24
Note that the highest percentage impact of 169% at the 0.85 quantile is less than
the percentage impact estimated in the corresponding speciﬁcation in the constant-
eﬀects model in Table 4 (182%). This suggests that the licensing eﬀect on mean
earnings in the constant-eﬀects model is relatively more sensitive to high earnings
outliers than the inclusion of zero earnings.
The bottom panel of Table 5 reports licensing eﬀects on median earnings in the
discontinuity sample only. Eﬀects at other quantiles are diﬃcult to identify given the
24The ﬁrst step estimate of E [κi|Xi,L i,Y i] in the quantile treatment eﬀects procedure is obtained
by estimating E [TRi|Yi,L i,X i] and E [TRi|Xi] in (5) by probit. Predicted values of E [κi|Xi,L i,Y i]
that are negative are set to zero leading to a reduced sample size. Standard errors are computed by
bootstrapping the ﬁrst and second step estimations 100 times.
21reduced variation in earnings and smaller sample size. The results indicate a large
eﬀect on median earnings, 239%. The corresponding percentage impact when treating
licensed as exogenous is 108%.B o t he ﬀects are precisely estimated. These percentage
impacts stand in sharp contrast to the percentage impact on mean earnings in the
discontinuity sample (342%).
The quantile regression and treatment eﬀects estimates reported in Table 5 can
be used to estimate the marginal distribution of monthly earnings without a license
both for immigrants that acquired a license and immigrants that did not acquire a
license. Potential earnings without a license for immigrants that acquired a license
are obtained by using the quantile treatment eﬀect coeﬃcients together with the
covariate means among those that acquired a license and setting the licensing status
dummy to zero. The counterfactual earnings of all immigrants with a license can be
approximated by the counterfactual earnings of compliers only, under the assumption
that compliers are a random sample of all immigrants with a license. The monthly
earnings without a license for immigrants that did not acquire a license are also
computed conditional on the mean of the covariates among immigrants that acquired
a license, and with the licensing status dummy set to zero, but using the quantile
regression coeﬃcients.
The ﬁg u r e si nt h et o pp a n e lo fT a b l e6 show that, in the full sample, licensed im-
migrants have lower potential earnings without a license than unlicensed immigrants
at all quantiles of the monthly earnings distribution. The results thus indicate nega-
tive selection into licensing status. The negative selection bias is greatest in the tails
and at the median of the distribution, varying between 36% and 38%. The bottom
panel of Table 6 shows that negative selection bias is also present at the median of
potential earnings in the discontinuity sample.
226 Entry Restrictions and Self-Selection
The empirical ﬁndings indicate exceedingly large returns to the acquisition of a license
as well as negative selection into licensing status. Negative selection is contrary to the
usual hypothesis of positive selection in which licensing improves the average quality
of service provided by practitioners. In this section, a decision model is developed
that illustrates how licensing can lead to both excess wages and lower average quality
of service.25
The model assumes a continuum of workers of type η,w h e r eη is drawn from
a distribution F(η). Individuals live for two periods and have a discount factor r.
In the ﬁrst period, individuals choose whether to invest in acquiring a license or
not. In the second period, all individuals work. Acquisition of a license in the ﬁrst
period involves both direct and indirect costs. The direct costs include the time and
eﬀort spent studying for exams and/or meeting other licensing requirements. Indirect
costs include the wage the person could earn in the unlicensed occupation in the ﬁrst
period. While direct costs are likely to be lower for more able (higher η) individuals,
the opportunity cost of acquiring a license is likely to increase with ability. The
existence of direct costs to meeting licensing requirements imply that fewer people
will enter the regulated occupation than otherwise. The assumption that costs vary
over individuals of diﬀerent types generates selection into the licensed occupation.
The direct costs of acquiring a license are speciﬁed as C
η ,r e ﬂecting that it is
easier for more able individuals to study for the licensing exam. Production in the
licensed and unlicensed sectors, YL(η,N L) and YU(η,N U), is assumed to be increasing
in η, thus generating higher opportunity costs to acquiring a license for persons with
higher ability. It is also assumed that there is diminishing returns with respect to
employment, NL and NU.
25The model is similar in spirit to the model of teacher certiﬁcation developed in Angrist and
Guryan (2002).
23Individuals seek to maximize lifetime income by choosing whether or not to acquire
a license. Individuals choose to acquire a license and work in the licensed occupation








wL and wU are the wages in the licensed and unlicensed occupations and are deﬁned
as the marginal products of labor in the two occupations, respectively. Equation (6)
states that a license will be acquired if the discounted increase in earnings in the
second period is greater than or equal to the sum of direct and indirect costs in the
ﬁrst period.
The decision rule can also be expressed in terms of the maximum direct cost
component C that individuals are willing to incur to acquire a license. The maximum
C is denoted as Cη
max. Cη





η[wL − (2 + r)wU]
(1 + r)
. (7)
An individual of type η thus chooses to work in the licensed occupation if Cη
max ≥ C
and chooses to work in the unlicensed occupation if Cη
max <C .
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If higher ability reduces the direct costs of acquiring a license (the ﬁrst term in (8))
by more than it increases foregone wages in the unlicensed sector (the second term in
(8))t h e n∂Cmax
∂η > 0 and higher ability types are more willing to pay for the license. In
this case, individuals with η ∈ [e η,η] work in the licensed occupation and individuals
24with η ∈ [η, e η] work in the unlicensed occupation, where e η is such that Ce η
max = C.
This case corresponds to positive selection into the licensed occupation.


















Note that licensing, a higher C, unambiguously increases average earnings in the
licensed occupation because e η increases. A higher e η reduces the supply of licensed
workers (NL =1− F (e η)) thus raising wages for all types in the licensed occupation.
This is the entry restriction eﬀect on earnings. A higher e η also raises average wages
by increasing the lower bound of the integral E(wL) in (9). This is the higher average
practitioner quality eﬀect on earnings.
If higher ability reduces the direct costs of acquiring a license by less than it
increases foregone wages in the unlicensed sector, then ∂Cmax
∂η < 0 and higher ability
types are less willing to pay for the license. In this case, individuals with η ∈ [η, e η]
work in the licensed occupation and individuals with η ∈ [e η,η] work in the unlicensed
occupation. This is the case of negative selection into the licensed occupation.


















Negative selection implies that licensing will have an ambiguous overall eﬀect on av-
erage earnings in the licensed occupation. Although a higher C reduces the supply
of licensed workers, by reducing e η and raising wages for all types in the licensed
25occupation, a lower e η reduces the upper bound of the integral E(wL) in (10).E n -
try restrictions raise average wages in the licensed occupation but reduced average
practitioner quality lowers the average wages of practitioners.
The negative selection found in the empirical analysis suggests that the wages
that high-skilled immigrant physicians earn as nonphysicians outweigh the lower di-
rect costs that these immigrants face in acquiring a license. Licensing requirements
for immigrant physicians thus lead to lower average quality of service. However,
the positive earnings eﬀect of entry restrictions far outweighs the lower practitioner
quality earnings eﬀect that licensing induces.
7E a r n i n g s C o n v e r g e n c e
Occupational entry restrictions and the acquisition of an occupational license may
have important implications for the economic assimilation of immigrants. In order
to assess the importance in this case, the median monthly earnings of immigrant
physicians that acquired a license are compared, at diﬀerent points in time since
arrival, to the median monthly earnings that immigrants would have received as
native physicians.26
The median monthly earnings of licensed immigrant physicians over time are sim-
ulated using the coeﬃcients from the quantile treatment eﬀects model. The median
earnings of licensed immigrants as comparable natives are simulated using the coef-
ﬁcients from a native physician median regression and the means of the covariates
among the licensed immigrants. The native physician data are drawn from the Is-
rael Central Bureau of Statistics Income Surveys of 1988 through 1995.T h es a m p l e
contains 324 observations on male and female native physician earnings (including
26The immigration literature usually assesses conditional economic assimilation in terms of mean
earnings convergence (Chiswick (1978)) and/or the coeﬃcient on time since migration in a mean
earnings regression (Lalonde and Topel (1992)). See also Borjas (1999) for further discussion.
26zeros for the unemployed). The covariates in the median regression are age and age
squared, an indicator for being male, an indicator for being married, an indicator
for being older than 46 and a full set of interactions with this latter age dummy.
Native physicians that are older than 46 have much stronger wage growth as a high
percentage of them are specialists. Immigrant physicians are more comparable with
younger native physicians since only 3% of the immigrants are specialists and 15%
are in specialist residency at the time of the survey.27
The diﬀerences in median earnings between immigrants and comparable natives
are illustrated in Figure 6.T h eﬁgures show a large and rather persistent earnings gap
over the ﬁrst 5 years since arrival. The median earnings of immigrants are 25% and
34% the median earnings of comparable natives in months 24 and 60, respectively.
Although acquisition of a license has a large percentage impact on the earnings of
immigrant physicians, acquisition of a license does not appear to substantially close
the earnings gap between licensed immigrants and comparable natives at the general
practitioner level. The excess wages that immigrants capture in the regulated occupa-
tion may be tempered by consumer and/or employer preferences for native services.
It is also possible that the large and persistent gap is due to positive selection of
native physicians into the licensed occupation in comparison to the negative selection
among immigrants.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper uses novel data on the early labor market outcomes of Soviet immigrant
physicians in Israel, and an exogenous immigrant re-training assignment rule, to iden-
tify the returns to an occupational license. Instrumental variables estimates of the
27The earnings of younger native physicians were not observed to be adversely aﬀected by the
mass immigration (see Sussman and Zakai (1999)). The coeﬃcients of the native physician median
regression are available upon request from the authors.
27returns are large and considerably higher than those estimated by OLS. The large
returns to an occupational license are highly suggestive of excess wages due to occu-
pational entry restrictions.
The returns to an occupational license are also measured using a quantile treat-
ment eﬀects model. The quantile treatment eﬀects model is less sensitive to the
inclusion of zero earnings for the unemployed as well as high earnings outliers. The
quantile treatment eﬀects estimates also yield large returns to a license, especially in
the upper quantiles of the complier earnings distribution. More highly skilled prac-
titioners thus beneﬁt more from license acquisition than do less skilled practitioners.
The quantile treatment eﬀects estimates also reveal negative selection into licensing
status, contrary to the usual hypothesis of positive selection.
In order to illustrate how occupational licensing can lead to both excess wages
and negative selection, a model of the decision to acquire a license is developed. The
model, together with the empirical ﬁndings, suggests that the wages that high-skilled
immigrant physicians earn as nonphysicians outweigh the lower direct costs that these
immigrants face in acquiring a license. Licensing thus leads to lower average quality
of service. However, the positive earnings eﬀect of entry restrictions far outweighs
the lower practitioner quality earnings eﬀect that licensing induces.
Lastly, the analysis of median earnings convergence between licensed immigrant
physicians and comparable natives shows that the importance of license acquisition
for the economic assimilation of immigrants is not substantial. There is a large
and persistent median earnings gap between immigrants and comparable natives.
Employer and/or consumer preferences for native services may temper the excess
wages that immigrants capture in the regulated occupation.
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32Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Exam Track Observation Track
% Licensed 72.71 88.57
% Employed 86.23 65.4
% Physician 58.7 37.14
















% Male 44.44 44.13
% Married Upon Arrival 84.3 79.36






% from Russia 46.14 41.59
% from Ukraine 16.67 23.81
% from City > 1,000,000 52.17 53.33
% Advanced Medical Degree 26.81 25.4
% Former Specialist 40.34 85.1
% Former General Practitioner 22.95 18.73
% Former Pediatrician 16.18 12.7
% Former OBGY 7.49 5.71
% Arrived in 1990 77.3 67.62
% Arrived in 1991 20.05 26.03
N 414 315
Notes: The Table reports means and percentages by assigned re-training track.  Standard
deviations are in parentheses.  Monthly earnings are in 1994 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) where 1
NIS equals 0.33 US dollars.  There are 382 exam track earnings observations and 294
observation track earnings observations (including zeros for the unemployed).Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Returns to a Medical License
Full Sample Discontinuity Sample


































Other Regressors NO YES YES YES YES YES
Root MSE 1,876 1,672 1,648 1,390 1,631 1,447
R² 0.0711 0.2847 0.3073 0.5086 0.3227 0.4702
N 676 676 676 676 181 181
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Other regressors include dummies for age upon arrival, year of arrival
months in Israel, gender, marital status, profession of spouse, number of children, size of last city of residence, Republic
of origin, advanced medical degrees, previous specialist status, previous type of medical practice and type of reported
earnings (after-tax and/or after other deductions).  The discontinuity sample in columns (5) and (6) uses the subsample of
observations between 14 and 26 years of previous physician experience.Table 3: Reduced Form Estimates of the Effect of Track on Monthly Earnings,
License Acquisition and Physician Employment


























































Other Regressors NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Root MSE 1,900 1,740 1,705 1,675 0.3961 0.3908 0.3854 0.3269 0.4891 0.4676 0.4639 0.4821
R² 0.0469 0.2257 0.2589 0.2857 0.038 0.0879 0.1153 0.226 0.0456 0.1506 0.1664 0.1755
N 676 676 676 181 729 729 729 203 729 729 729 203
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Other regressors include dummies for age of arrival, year of arrival, months in Israel, gender,
marital status, profession of spouse, number of children, size of last city of residence, Republic of origin, advanced medical degrees, previous
specialist status, previous type of medical practice and type of reported earnings (after-tax and/or after other deductions).  The discontinuity
sample in Columns (4), (8), and (12) uses the subsample of observations between 12 and 26 years of previous physician experience.  The































Other Regressors NO YES YES YES YES
Root MSE 3,245 1,722 1,659 1,672 1,646
R² − 0.2417 0.2982 0.2883 0.3099
N 676 676 676 676 181
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Licensed is instrumented with Track.  Other regressors
include dummies for age upon arrival, year of arrival, months in Israel, gender, marital status, profession
of spouse, number of children, size of last city of residence, Republic of origin, advanced medical
degrees, previous specialist status, previous type of medical practice and type of reported earnings (after-
tax and/or after other deductions).  The discontinuity sample in Column (5) uses the subsample of
observations between 14 and 26 years of previous physician experience.Table 5: Quantile Regression and Treatment Effects Estimates
Quantile Regression Estimates Treatment Effects Estimates






















% Impact 0.9316 1.1748 0.8316 0.7825 0.588 0.4959 0.4992 1.4664 1.0764 1.6884
Pseudo R² 0.1626 0.2467 0.2397 0.2116 0.2055 0.119 0.1744 0.2315 0.1579 0.1748







% Impact −− 1.0761 −− −− 2.3863 −−
Pseudo R² −− 0.1897 −− −− 0.2413 −−
N −− 181 −− −− 164 −−
Notes: Other regressors include a quadratic in previous physician experience, dummies for age upon arrival, year of arrival,
months in Israel, Republic of origin, advanced medical degrees, previous specialist status, previous type of medical practice
and type of reported earnings (after-tax and/or after other deductions).  The discontinuity sample is the subsample of
observations between 14 and 26 years of previous physician experience. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.  The
bootstrapped standard errors when licensed are treated as endogenous and adjusted for the first step estimation.Table 6: Earnings Quantiles without a License
Quantiles
0.15 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.85
A. Full Sample
Licensed Immigrants 239 515 760 1,476 1,643
Unlicensed Immigrants 385 548 1,199 1,859 2,563
% Selection Bias -0.379 -0.0597 -0.3656 -0.2059 -0.359
B. Discontinuity Sample
Licensed Immigrants −− 751 −−
Unlicensed Immigrants −− 1,016 −−
% Selection Bias −− -0.2606 −−
Notes:   The table reports monthly earnings quantiles without a license for immigrants that acquired a
license and for immigrants that did not acquire a license.  Earnings without a license for immigrants
that acquired a license are calculated using quantile treatment effect estimates.  Earnings without a
license for immigrants that did not acquire a license are calculated using quantile regression estimates.












Figure 1: Track Assignment, License and Employment Outcomes
Physician Experience in former USSR
 Proportion on Observation Track  Proportion Licensed
 Proportion Employed As Physicia



































Figure 2: License Acquisition and Monthly Earnings
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Figure 3: License and Physician Employment Outcomes - Residuals
Physician Experience in former USSR
 License Probability Residuals  Physician Employment Residuals






































Figure 4: License Acquisition and Monthly Earnings - Residuals
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Figure 5: Physician Employment and Monthly Earnings - Residuals
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Figure 6: Median Earnings Convergence
Months Since Arrival
 Licensed Immigrants  Licensed Natives
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000